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I am here to pay respect to the victims and to express words of apology and
regret . . .I am here to create the possibility for Croatia and Serbia to turn
the page so that our children will not be burdened by the history of the wars
of the 1990s . . .
Boris Tadić, President of Serbia, visiting Croatia in 2010.1
We have gathered in this place of memory and suffering to ensure that the
errors from the past will never repeat. . . I am asking forgiveness on behalf
of those who bloodstained their hands by committing here or elsewhere in
this region, horrible crimes against humanity. . .
Monsignor Giorgio Lingua, Papal nuncio in Croatia, at the Jasenovac
concentration camp memorial site, April 2021.
By praying today for the victims and for our neighbors, we do not want to
use the victims in order to deepen the spiral of conflict, or to wage wars
with commemorative policies of remembrance; for if we did that, we would
become captives of the self-pitiful discourses and paralyze ourselves; we
would thus imprison both the victims and the survivors in a permanent,
helpless and hopeless state of mind. The narrative of the victim, if the only
possible one, cannot be the mover and the source of inspiration but an
eternal torment and a living hell for all of us. . .
Serbian Patriarch Porphyry, in August 2021 commemorating the end
of the 1991-1995 Serb-Croat war.
All Victims Matter: A Recapitulation of Reconciliation Efforts in Postwar Balkans
From 2010-2021, nations and faiths of the postwar Western Balkans saw a number of
remarkable attempts toward an interfaith and interethnic reconciliation. This author, focusing on
elite-level commemorations from 2019-2020, presented the theme in the December 2021 issue of
“Serbian President Tadić apologizes for Vukovar massacre”, Deutsche Welle,
https://www.dw.com/en/serbian-president-Tadić-apologizes-for-vukovar-massacre/a-6188935
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OPREE.2 In short, from January 2019 to August 2021, religious leaders of Catholic Croats and
Eastern Orthodox Serbs (also joined by Croatian and Bosnian Muslims, Jews and Evangelical
Christians), as well as democratically elected political leaders, took part a series of conciliatory
gatherings and commemorations at memorial sites of wartime suffering. My article concludes
optimistically:
Overall, the recent progress toward reconciliation of the peoples and faiths in the Balkans
is good news. The moderates within ruling nationalists’ ranks marginalized the extremists
domestically and found support abroad, notably in the European Union, which is interested
in fostering greater stability in the troubled southeastern periphery, as well as from the
Vatican, both during the pontificate of John Paul II and under Pope Francis. . . The ritual
reconciliation and commemorations dedicated to all innocent victims of the conflict, which
is now being increasingly perceived as a tragedy rather than triumph, is not without its
value and has been working well during the last two years. Therefore, let's give peace a
chance. Commemorations that acknowledge and honor all victims and call for forgiveness
and reconciliation of faiths and peoples, even though it may be only symbolic, will help
normalize and civilize these wounded societies. . .3
After the 1991-1995 war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, two papal visits occurred,
emphasizing the long history of peaceful interfaith and interethnic life, and launching the “forgive
and ask forgiveness” initiative. In 2010, secular forces joined the conciliatory path when liberalleftists parties replaced right-wing ethnic nationalists in power in Croatia and Serbia. Pope Francis
has continued his predecessor’s Balkan peace initiative. In 2017, Francis showed good will toward
the Serbian Orthodox church by considering its patriarch’s objections to the canonization of
Croatian Cardinal Alojzije Stepinac (1899-1960), whom the Serbian Church holds accountable for
the forcible conversions of Serbs during World War II. Pope Francis froze the process leading to
sainthood of this cleric beatified for his resistance to communism, leaving the dispute to a joint
Serb-Croat committee of experts. Earlier, Croatian bishops had made a similar move of good will
toward the sister-church of Serbia. In 1995, an episcopal letter on the fiftieth anniversary of the
Second World War expresses remorse and compassion and appeals for forgiveness. Croatian
bishops specifically write about the suffering of the Serbian Orthodox Church at hands of the Croat
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ultranationalist “Ustasha” regime in the Second World War. Pope Francis quoted the excerpts in
his 2020 encyclical Fratelli tutti.
Concurrently, individual church leaders, of their own volition, exchanged apologies and
appeared in public together to testify to the desire for reconciliation. The pioneers were Monsignor
Mate Uzinić, then the Bishop of Dubrovnik, and Grigorije Durić, then Serb Orthodox Bishop of
Herzegovina. In 1996, on behalf of practicing Serb believers from his diocese, Bishop Grigorije
expressed regret for the casualties of war, and asked forgiveness for the Serb-Montenegrin army’s
bombardment of the historic Croatian coastal city of Dubrovnik in 1991. Bishop Grigorije’s
example inspired Milo Đukanović, President of Montenegro, to apologize to Croatia and, in
particular, to citizens of Dubrovnik, the medieval city-monument near the Croat-Montenegrin
border.
The process gained momentum in 2010, with the involvement of democratically elected
political representatives of Serbia and Croatia. Boris Tadić and Ivo Josipović, liberal-leftist
politicians who had earlier opposed ethnic nationalism, commemorated together civilian victims
at memorial sites of mass suffering. Mr. Tadić apologized for the 1991 massacre of wounded
prisoners of war in the city of Vukovar, perpetrated by Serb forces against Croat defenders and
civilians. "I am here to pay respect to the victims and to express words of apology and regret . . . I
am here to create the possibility for Croatia and Serbia to turn the page so that our children will
not be burdened by the history of the 1990s," President Tadić stated on this occasion.4 The two
presidents also visited the nearby town of Paulin Dvor to honor eighteen Serb civilians killed there
by Croat troops.
The reconciliation process thus advanced in Croatia and in Serbia, but not in BosniaHerzegovina (hereinafter referred to as BH), the neighboring state hit hardest by the 1992-1995
war. The major reason was that Serbia remained unprepared to admit to genocide at Srebrenica
despite the Hague Tribunal verdicts. President Tadić wrote in the Wall Street Journal: “The
massacre of thousands of Bosnian Muslims in the town of Srebrenica in July 1995 constituted one
of the most tragic chapters of the Yugoslav civil wars of the 1990s. In order to show that Serbia
mourns for all the victims, I traveled to Srebrenica a year after I was first elected president of
Serbia to stand with the survivors and bow to victims on the 10th anniversary of that terrible

“Serbian President Tadić apologizes for Vukovar massacre”, Deutsche Welle,
https://www.dw.com/en/serbian-president-Tadić-apologizes-for-vukovar-massacre/a-6188935
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atrocity.”5 Bosnian Muslims did not accept Tadić’s apology. The Christian Science Monitor,
among other international observers, cast doubts about Tadić’s and other Serb leaders’ sincerity
when they speak about Serbian accountability for war crimes.6 To this day, neither Serbia nor the
Serb republic in BH have adopted the EU resolution that bans genocide-denial concerning
Srebrenica. When Montenegro adopted this resolution in 2021, Serb nationalists called it treason.
However, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the land in between Serbia and Croatia, which suffered
most casualties and destruction in the war, also showed the desire for reconciliation. A sociological
study titled “Preparedness for Reconciliation in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” published in 2010 in
Sarajevo, argues that most of the population in BH desires reconciliation among the ethnic groups
involved in the 1992-1995 war, even as fifteen postwar years might seem like an insufficient time
for healing. Ethnoreligious nationalism, coupled with corruption of the political elites, are,
according to this study, the main obstacles to reconciliation. The study concludes: “The most
valuable legacies that we can today hand out to our children are truth, justice, forgiveness, and
reconciliation . . .”7
The 2010-2021 drive for reconciliation also involved the forces “from below.” These
include peace activists and various associations of civil society emerging after the fall of
communism. These efforts work on unification across state boundaries, such as a 2011 regional
initiative searching for truth about the wars and their victims. The “Initiative for the Establishment
of a Regional Commission for the Establishment of Facts on War Crimes and Other Serious
Human Rights Violations Committed in the Territory of the Former SFR Yugoslavia from January
1, 1991, to December 31, 2001,” is best known as the RECOM Reconciliation Network (or
REKOM; see footnote).8 It is a Balkan version of “truth and reconciliation” commission, similar
to such initiatives in other post-conflict societies worldwide. However, although all post-Yugoslav
states initially agreed to cooperate on this project, nationalist regimes and ethnic parties have
obstructed the initiative. To make matters worse, ethnic nationalists in all states continue insulting
victims by glorifying war criminals as patriots and heroes.
“An Apology for Srebrenica. For most of our history interethnic and faith-based pluralism was the norm in the
Western
Balkans.”
By Boris
Tadić,
The
Wall
Street
Journal,
04/16.
2010,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303695604575182284149946008.
6
“War crimes: Is Serbia's Srebrenica apology genuine?” The Christian Science Monitor, 03/31. 2010,
https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2010/0331/War-crimes-Is-Serbia-s-Srebrenica-apology-genuine.
7
Srđan Puhalo, Nebojša Petrović ,and Neda Perišić, eds. Spremnost na pomirenje u Bosni i Hercegovini. [Readiness
for reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina] (Sarajevo: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010), p. 5.
8
REKOM mreža pomirenja. RECOM Reconciliation Network, https://www.recom.link/en/category/about-recom/
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Another step forward took place in January 2019, when seventeen Serb and Croat bishops
met in Požega, in northern Croatia, and released a public statement with an unprecedented
conciliatory rhetoric:
We remember the grave suffering of the Serb and Croatian peoples and other citizens of
Croatia during the recent past in wars, conflicts, persecutions, and killings, caused by
hatred. We are aware that by accusing each other, manipulating historical truth, interpreting
war events for daily political purposes, and continuing with mutual insults and degradations
only because of belonging to different faiths and nationalities, we will remain captives of
the past and losers in the present. . .We deeply regret and honor every innocent victim of
any nationality, religious affiliation or political viewpoint from our recent past . . .. Only
by seeking mutual forgiveness we can rise above the evil that ashamed, diminished and
humiliated us. . .. 9
A series of joint interfaith gatherings and commemorations that followed echoed the ideas
from the seventeen bishops’ meeting. These gatherings brought together Catholics, Serb Orthodox,
Protestant, Jewish and Muslim religious leaders. Secular leaders and representatives of civil
society associations from all regional states held separate commemorations in the memorial park
Jasenovac, under the massive “Flower monument” and a museum dedicated to the victims.
Another breakthrough took place in 2020. Croatia’s Prime Minister, Andrej Plenković, in
cooperation with the Serbian National Council (Srpsko narodno vijeće SNV) representing the Serb
ethnic community in Croatia, sought a dignified commemoration, instead of the previous
triumphant victory parade celebrating the end of the 1991-1995 war in Croatia. Both premier
Plenković and Croatian president Zoran Milanović, joined by leaders of the Serbian National
Council, made statements of regret and compassion for innocent Serb civilian victims, and
condemned the perpetrators. In December 2020, joint Serb-Croat commemorations were held at
the city of Vukovar, where the war began with its siege and destruction. There, Veran Matić,
Serbian human rights activist and President of Serbia’s envoy for a Serb-Croat search for wartime
missing persons, reenacted Willy Brandt’s historic kneeling at Warsaw ghetto.
Early in 2021, Archbishop Giorgio Lingua, Apostolic Nuncio to Croatia, visited Jasenovac.
With him were two bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Protestant leaders, and
representatives of Jewish and Islamic Communities in Croatia. On this occasion, the nuncio
remarkably said: "We have gathered here to make sure that the mistakes and sins committed in
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history will never repeat . . . I ask forgiveness on behalf of all those who stained their hands with
blood of innocent victims here or elsewhere--they committed crimes against humanity."10 Croatian
sociologist of religion Ivan Markešić wrote in a commentary: “The papal nuncio representing Pope
Francis thereby condemned Ustasha crimes asked forgiveness on behalf of Croatian Catholics,
including clergy and bishops. Will Serbian Orthodox Church finally accept this apology from the
highest Catholic authority?”11 Croatian Jewish authorities thanked the nuncio for his words at
Jasenovac, but the Serbian Orthodox Church ignored it, as well as they ignored the Croatian
bishops’ 1995 letter expressing regret for Serb victims and condemning Ustasha crimes.
Apparently, the Serbian Orthodox church is under a decisive influence by Bishop Nikolai
Velimirović, canonized in 2003. Velimirović was an anti-ecumenical, specifically anti-Catholic,
Serb church leader, who led the 1937 campaign against the concordat between the Vatican and the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia. After WW2, he accused the entire Catholic Church in Croatia of genocide
against Serbs, naming the Vatican as its instigator, and wrote against reconciliation between the
Orthodox and Catholics.12 Neither the Vatican nor Croatian clergy protested or objected his
canonization, as had the Serbian Orthodox Church regarding Cardinal Stepinac.
At any rate, from the second half of 2020 to early 2021, the reconciliation initiative reached
its peak. Moreover, optimism hit the roof after the election of a new Serbian patriarch. The
Patriarch Porphyry (or Porifirije, born in 1961 as Prvoslav Perić, in the northern Serbian Vojvodina
province) was a younger, internationally educated and apparently reform-minded cleric. He served
five years as Metropolitan Archbishop for Orthodox believers in the Croatian capital Zagreb. There
he earned respect from Catholic moderates, ecumenical-minded theologians, and Croat liberal and
leftist intellectual circles. Porphyry’s election also encouraged the liberal intelligentsia and reformminded Orthodox believers in Serbia.
The new patriarch introduced a war conciliatory rhetoric into public discourse, a sharp
contrast to militant nationalism of his predecessor Patriarch Irinej. Porphyry has said that he thinks
of himself as Christian first and an ethnic Serb second, and that he considers Croatia his second
„Okupili
smo
se
u
Jasenovcu
da
se
ne
ponove
greške
iz
prošlosti“,
Novosti,
03/26.2021, https://www.portalnovosti.com/danas-u-jasenovcu-odrzana-prva-medureligijska-molitva
11
Ivan
Markešić,
“Važnost
jasenovačkog
molitvenog susreta”,
Autograf.hr,
07.
04. 2021.
https://www.autograf.hr/vaznost-jasenovackog-molitvenog-susreta/
12
Vjekoslav Perica, Pomirenje i posljednji dani. Balkanske nacije u mitovima i muzejima slave, stida i srama.
[Reconciliation and the last days. Balkan Nations in myths and museums of glory, embarrassment, and shame]
(Belgrade: Biblioteka XX vek, 2021), pp. 91-94.
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homeland. Porphyry wrote warm holiday greetings and sent friendly messages to citizens of
Zagreb and Croatia. Once, accompanied by Catholic Archbishop of Zagreb, Cardinal Bozanić,
Porphyry walked the streets of the Croatian capital city, cheered by Zagreb residents. Porphyry
often used references from urban pop culture and rock music of late socialism. Thus, he became
popular among the nostalgic generation of former Yugoslavs once united across ethnoreligious
divisions. Many liberal opinion makers in Zagreb and Belgrade expressed great expectations for
the new leader of the largest church in Western Balkans.13 A major Balkan rapprochement was
also hoped for in Germany. Under the headline “Croatia’s Year of Reconciliation,” Deutshce Welle
reports in 2021:
Croatia has moved away from right-wing nationalist politics, as evidenced by the
convincing election victory of moderately conservative Prime Minister Andrej Plenković
and then his gestures of reconciliation in co-operation with the leadership of the Serbian
National Council. The relations between Croats and Serbs in Croatia last year were marked
by significant gestures of reconciliation. The extent to which this is pure symbolism, and
the extent to which it is a permanent and sustainable process will be shown by the new
year. . . The atmosphere in the country is better . . .14
Yet many people across the region remained skeptical, the foremost of which were Bosnian
Muslims, as the new patriarch rarely visited BH or talked about the massive suffering of the 19921995 war. Instead, Porphyry would most often talk about World War II, Jasenovac, and the Ustasha
genocide. He never mentioned genocide at Srebrenica, and other Serb crimes for which exist
relevant verdicts by the Hague Tribunal (ICTY). In general, Porphyry avoided historical
controversies. Secular human rights activists therefore remained skeptical of the entire new clericled reconciliation. Their practices were described as symbolic, ritual moves that never address the
key issues about interethnic conflicts in the recent and earlier wars. A declaration from 2020, “In
Defense of History: Historians against Revisionism,” brought together Serb, Croat, Bosnian, and
other regional historians, urging a resolute action to halt nationalistic abuses of history and
historical revisionism, let alone the glorification of the war criminals sentenced by the international

Veran
Matić,
“Novotalasni
patrijarh,”
[Newlymade
patriarch]
Novosti,
02/19.2021,
https://www.portalnovosti.com/novotalasni-patrijarh; “Porfirijevi kružoci: Malo tko zna da je novi patrijarh SPC-a u
Zagrebu redovito okupljao birano društvo” [Porfiriye’s circles: Few know that the new patriarch of the SPC regularly
gathered in Zagreb selected society], Novi list, 02/21/2021, https://www.novilist.hr/novosti/hrvatska/porfirijevikruzoci-malo-tko-zna-da-je-novi-patrijarh-spc-a-u-zagrebu-redovito-okupljao-birano-drustvo/
14
“Hrvatska godina pomirenja,“ [Croatia’s year of reconciliation} Deutsche Welle, 01/03. 2021,
https://www.dw.com/hr/hrvatska-godina-pomirenja/a-56118943
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tribunal and other courts.15 Similarly, peace activist Vesna Teršelić from Zagreb pointed out in an
interview: “Now, like many times before, sporadic conciliatory attempts may be part of an
ambivalent and reversible process, leading back to conflict. . .”16
Vučić’s Serbia Undermines Reconciliation in Croatia
The new moderate Serbian patriarch has somewhat softened the nationalistic rhetoric in Serbia
but did not affect its hardline nationalist president. On the contrary, Aleksandar Vučić would soon
use the new patriarch as a tool of Vučić’s pressures on neighboring states. Although Vučić’s
predecessor, President Tadić, expressed regret for Serbia’s aggressive war, and Vučić’s envoy
Matić genuflected at the Vukovar memorial, the Vučić regime would discontinue these practices,
even rejecting the very idea of public apologies. Specifically in terms of Croatia, Vučić did not
like the idea of the Serb-Croat rapprochement as manifested in 2020. The close cooperation
between the Serbian ethnic minority leaders with Croatian authorities further angered Belgrade.
Vučić would pressure Croatian Serbs to frequently come to Belgrade for consultations with
Serbia’s government, thereby recognizing Serbia as their matrix state and the regional political
headquarters. Consequently, the representatives of Serbs from Croatia, would move away from the
Croatian government reconciliation program. Although repeatedly invited by the Prime Minister
Andrej Plenković, the Croatian Serb leaders abstained from the 2021 commemoration at Knin.
Their excuses to the media were awkward and confused. The former Croatian president Ivo
Josipović, who, with the Serb president Boris Tadić, pioneered the Serbo-Croat rapprochement in
2010, argued in an interview that the Vučić regime might have pressured Croatian Serbs to quit
cooperating with Croatian government regarding the joint commemorations. A German observer
argues that “there are also those who think that the representatives of Serbs from Croatia this year
should not attend the Knin commemoration, primarily because the Belgrade government does not
want to see Croats and Serbs from Croatia working together and becoming closer to each other.”17

"Povjesničari bivše Jugoslavije: Niste samo žrtve niti su dru-gi za sve krivi!"[Historians of Former Yugoslavia: You
are not only victims nor are others guilty for everything]. Večernji list, 06/17. 2020, https://www.vecernji.hr/kultura/nakon-one-o-zajednickom-jeziku-povjesnicari-bivse-jugoslavije-donijeli-deklaraciju-o-povijesnomrevizionizmu-14105 14.
15

“Hrvatska godina pomirenja,“ Deutsche Welle.
“Proslava Oluje: Je li zapela politika pomirenja i uključivosti?“ [Celebration of The Storm: Did the politic of
reconciliation and inclusivity get stuck?] Deutsche Welle, 08/05. 2021, https://www.dw.com/hr/proslava-oluje-je-lizapela-politika-pomirenja-i-uklju%C4%8Divosti/a-58763679
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Such assessments soon proved accurate. In August 2021, as Croatia commemorated at
Knin the end of the 1991-1995 war, President Vučić staged a “counter-commemoration” in a town
near Belgrade populated by Serbs from Croatia who fought in the war and escaped the Croat
offensive. The new patriarch Porphyry attended this event. President Vučić and his lieutenants
spoke about an alleged continuation of the persecution of Serbs in Croatia from World War II to
the 1991-1995 war, as if all Croat government were the same as or only variants of the pro-Nazi
Ustasha. Patriarch Porphyry tried to tone down the resentful rhetoric. He spoke about “many good
and Serb-loving Croats” he met during his episcopal duty in Croatia. In particular, the following
statement, published in Croatia by the liberal Catholic internet portal Autograf under the headline,
“We do not want to wage wars through commemorative politics of remembrance,” is attributed to
Porphyry:
By praying today for the victims, for our neighbors, we do not want to use them in order
to deepen the spiral of conflict, or wage wars with commemorative policies of
remembrance; much less to become captives of self-pitiful discourses and paralyze
ourselves by imprisoning the victims and the survivors in a permanent, helpless, and
hopeless state of mind. The narrative of the victim, if the only possible one, cannot be the
mover and the source of inspiration. Rather, it is permanent torment and a living hell for
all of us. . .. 18
Apparently, the new Patriarch, at least initially, tried to soften the Vučić regime’s nationalist
fervor. Yet, the diehard nationalist Vučić, a wartime aide of the sentenced war criminal Vojislav
Šešelj, would ultimately put the new Patriarch in his place to serve the Serbian state, whatever its
agenda may be.
Vučić’s plan to undermine the Serb-Croat rapprochement in Croatia had begun much
earlier. Vučić’s Serbia had intensified the commemorations of Jasenovac and the Ustasha
genocide, adding new museums and memorial sites in Serbia and the Bosnian-Serb republic. Vučić
also urged Serbs in Croatia to prioritize the commemorations of the Croatian Serbs’ suffering in
World War II and spoke more frequently of the Ustasha genocide. Early in 2021, Vučić’s regime
funded and released the feature film called Dara, a girl from Jasenovac, graphically depicting
Ustasha tortures of Serb prisoners at the Jasenovac concentration camp. Shortly after the release,
more than two million people in Serbia saw the film on national TV. “The purpose of this film was

„Ne želimo voditi ratove komemorativnim politikama sećanja,“ [We don’t want to carryon war with
commemorative politics of memory] Autograf.hr, 08/05.2021, https://www.autograf.hr/ne-zelimo-voditi-ratovekomemorativnim-politikama-secanja/
18
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to incite hatred,” the Serb scholar and social critic Aleksandra Đurić Bosnić, said in an interview.19
The new wave of ethnic hatred in Serbia suited Vučić’s tabloids to intensify anti-Croat reportage.
At sporting events, Serb soccer fans shouted hateful anti-Croat, anti-Bosniak, and anti-Albanian
slogans. Vučić-controlled media pressured patriarch Porphyry to comment on this film on national
TV with President Vučić standing next to him; Porphyry had to say how deeply moved he was by
the horrors of Ustasha tortures.20 Serbia sent the movie to Hollywood as an official candidate for
the Best Foreign Film award. The candidacy was Serbia’s counter move to a new Bosnian-made
film, Quo Vadis Aida, about Serb genocide against Bosnian Muslims at Srebrenica. The Bosnian
film made the short list, while the Serbian was rejected. Subsequently, at the 34th European Film
Awards in Berlin, Quo Vadis Aida won the “European Oscar” for best picture, best director, and
lead actress. To this day, the Vučić regime has blocked access to Quo Vadis Aida from movie
theaters of Serbia.

The Other Europe: From Communism to Fascism
After undermining the reconciliation process in Croatia, the Vučić regime moved to
destabilize Montenegro and BH through incidents staged by the Serb minority in northern Kosovo,
constantly provoking the Albanian government. Vučić also reintroduced what is basically the wellknown Great Serbian strategy that caused the Balkan wars of the 1990s, under the new label “Serb
World” (srpski svet). The phrase is borrowed from Vladimir Putin’s new ideology, inaugurated for
the annexation of the Crimea in 2014, known as “Russian world” (“Русский мир”).21 According
to a CNN analysis, “the Russian World is wherever there are Russian speakers . . . wherever there
is a Russian church--it does not acknowledge existing political borders . . ."22
The “Russian world” ideology has been in the making for at least two decades or longer,
to become a national ideology of the new post-communist (and anticommunist) Putin’s Russia.
Although still confusing, and attractive to some leftist circles worldwide that support this Russia

“Aleksandra Đurić Bosnić: ‘Dara iz Jasenovca’ je imala cilj da proizvede mržnju,” [“Dara from Jasenovac” had
the
goal
to
produce
hatred,]
Al
Jazeera
Balkans,
02/27.
2021,
https://balkans.aljazeera.net/amp/teme/2021/2/27/bosnic-duric-dara-iz-jasenovca-je-imala-cilj-da-proizvede-mrznju.
20
“Patrijarh srpski Porfirije, o filmu Dara iz Jasenovca,” [Serbian patriarch Porphyry about the film Dara from
Jasenovac]. YouTube, https://youtu.be/GeT6oPphvXQ
21
“Yes, He Would’: Fiona Hill on Putin and Nukes” , Politico Magazine, 02/28. 2022,
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/02/28/world-war-iii-already-there-00012340
22
“In Putin's vision for the world, a medieval narrative resurfaces”, CNN, 03/14. 2022,
https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/14/europe/patriarch-Kirilll-putin-spiritual-battle-intl-cmd/index.html
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as a supposed successor of the earlier Leninist, Stalinist, and Soviet precedents which at least
declared themselves as leftist, Putin’s Russia is the world champion and principal supporter of
rightist authoritarian ideologies and regimes. This blend of the Russian nationalist and imperialist
myths, from tsarist to Soviet and post-Soviet times, with the new religious nationalism, has been
already categorized as an ultranationalist and conservative ideology of the right, though it
incorporates some revised communist-era myths as well. For American historian Timothy Snyder,
the case in point is a “Russian fascism,” not just because of the revival of the proto-fascist
philosopher Ivan Iljin, but that the system sanctioned in Putin’s Russia entails many other features
of fascism.23 As such, it has been applied in the new authoritarian anti-western and anti-liberal
state, and in the wars in Georgia, Chechnya, Syria, the annexation of the Crimea and the current
invasion of Ukraine.
Vučić’s Serbia imported and rephrased only the label (“the Serb world”), because the
ideology and the system were already inaugurated in the mid-1980s, applied throughout Slobodan
Milošević’s era and the Balkan wars of the 1990s initiated by Milošević. A Serb scholar noted the
similarity between “Putin’s and Milošević’s evil ideas and tragic consequences they caused.”24
Slobodan Milošević was indicted for war crimes by the Hague Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
and his allies in BH, Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, were sentenced for genocide and crimes
against humanity. Their ideology and war aims were developed by a Great Serbian nationalist
mass movement in the 1980s, resulting in wars and ethnic cleansing through the 1990s. Milošević
himself is described by some analysts as a post-communist fascist.25 He was not an isolated
phenomenon, however. Even before Putin’s war in Ukraine that unmasked the new Russian
fascism, variants of post-communist fascisms can be observed in Eastern Europe and Russia,
including in Ukraine.26 Similarly, a Croatian writer described the ideology of the longest-reigning
post-communist “HDZ” party in Croatia as a “two-headed monster” that attempts to blend in a
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populist coexistence “the fascists and the antifascists.”27 However, only in Russia and Serbia have
these post-communist fascisms, consolidated in authoritarian societies, produced major wars of
aggression, land grab, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing. Many observers drew parallels between
ethnic cleansing in present-day Ukraine and in the Balkan wars of the 1990s. Several exhibits are
held on the 30th anniversary of the siege of Sarajevo, showing western reporters’ images of
destruction of cities, including new photos and videos of devastated cities of Ukraine. The
Belgrade-based Serb writer Tomislav Marković was first in the Balkans, and perhaps in Europe,
to write about what he considered Russian genocide in Ukraine, in which the aggressor, as publicly
announced in Russian state-controlled media, aims not just at ethnic cleansing but the complete
obliteration of Ukrainian distinct, non-Russian, culture and nationality.28
Because of the necessary anticommunist component in these post-communist ideologies,
new ideologies require the marginalization of WWII communist-led antifascism. Yet, Putin’s
Russia kept the Soviet “Great Patriotic War” myth alive. Hence, the Ukrainians are portrayed as
“Nazis,” although the Russian invasion and its “denazification” involves Nazi methods and Nazi
ways of reasoning. Russian dissidents warn about this contradiction, which can survive only in a
North Korea-like state.29 Similarly, Serbia’s new national identity marginalizes the Yugoslav
communist leader Tito, but declares as “antifascists” several Serbs who were World War II
anticommunist leaders and Nazi collaborators, such as the Chetnik Dragoljub Mihailović, General
Milan Nedić, and the native Serb fascist Dimitrije Ljotić, whose organization’s spiritual advisor
was the religious nationalist Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović, canonized by the Serbian Orthodox
Church.30
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The link between religious nationalism and ethnic cleansing in the Balkans is wellresearched and can help in understanding the war in Ukraine.31 Like some leaders of the Serbian
Orthodox Church in the 1990s, the Patriarch of Moscow, Kirill, has strongly backed Putin’s war
in Ukraine. Yet, this time, many Orthodox churches and theologians criticize Kirill: “‘Russkii mir,’
the Russian equivalent of ‘blood & soil’ ideology at the heart of Putin’s war, is explained and
rejected by theologians in new statement,” The Religion Dispatches wrote in March 2022.32
According to the Orthodox Times,
the number of priests of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the jurisdiction of Patriarch
Kirill of Moscow and All Russia (Gundyaev) has risen above 400, addressing the Council
of Heads of Eastern Churches (considering him the supreme authority of world
Orthodoxy), suing Kirill as a heretic. They claim that Kirill preaches the doctrine of the
"Russian world" (Russian: "Русский мир"), which is the key reason for the war, and he
deviates from Orthodox teaching, so it should be condemned as heresy. Kirill is also
charged with moral crimes of blessing the war against Ukraine and full support for the
aggressive actions of Russian troops on Ukrainian soil.33
Nevertheless, Vučić’s Serbia still supports Putin, both by not imposing sanctions as
required by the EU and possibly helping Russia to break them. Serbian religious scholar Vladimir
Veljković writes:
According to Russian Patriarch Kirill, Orthodox civilization consists of all Orthodox
believers in the world, and then all nations that have formed their national identity under
the influence of Orthodoxy . . . the Russian world is not only ecclesiastical, it is not only
cultural, but I would say, even geopolitical," Kirill once said. . . (Similarly in Serbia and
the Srpska Republic), “it is just not clear when the military action will start: soon or only
after the triumph of the Russian world in Ukraine and after the capitulation of the entire
West? By the way, among Serbian bishops, a lot of Kosovo's hope was placed in Vladimir
Putin. He was solemnly welcomed in Belgrade, where he installed a mosaic cube in the
Church of St. Sava in January 2019 in the presence of the then Patriarch Irinej, Vučić, and
the party members as well as masses of Serb believers. . .34
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Sonja Biserko, president of Serbia’s Helsinki committee for human rights, argues that the
“Serb world” ideology carries the risk of causing new wars in the Balkans: “Serbia's geopolitical
interest in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the preservation of the Serb republic (RS) and its annexation
to Serbia. RS is considered the only Serbian victory of the 1990s and is therefore treated as Serbia's
foreign policy priority…”35 In the similar vein, the Serb scholar and activist Aleksandra Bosnić
Đurić writes:
In these ideological templates, Russia is an eternal friend and source of goodness, and the
West an eternal enemy from which all evil comes. The Russian and the Serbian worlds are,
obviously, ideologically two compatible concepts based on almost identical arguments and
consciously produced conspiracy theories. The lack of empathy among the indoctrinated is
frightening, as we watch the ruthlessly destroyed Ukrainian cities every day. And that lack
of empathy, that blindness and that indifference, unfortunately, is quite similar to the one
we remember from the 1990s. In the Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik is an active and
agile promoter of the program of the Serbian world and its indoctrination. . .. 36
For non-Serbs in the western Balkans, who were greatly affected by the wars of the 1990s,
the Russian invasion of Ukraine bred fear of another, much stronger Serbian aggression, this time
backed by Russia. Western observers have also noted a growing Russian influence in the western
Balkans, and Putin’s calculations with exporting the Ukraine war to another European unstable
zone.37 “The idea of creating a "Greater Serbia" is on the table again,” explains Serb antinationalist fighter and writer Tomislav Marković in a 2021 article, continuing: “only now it is
called a little differently, because the term in question is notorious and inextricably linked to
horrific crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocide. . .”38 In the similar vein, Serb historian Nikola
Samardžić explains: “Vučić managed to bind all institutions, services, governmental and non-
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governmental bodies, the Church, the largest part of the NGO sector to the idea and realization of
the “Serbian world” (srpski svet), which Russia is a stronghold.”39
In his speeches, Aleksandar Vučić often uses the paradigmatic fascist rhetoric of national
humiliation. The neighboring states and the great powers that backed them, Vučić complains,
“want to humiliate Serbia.”40 He specifically had in mind the loss of Kosovo, aided by the USA,
and the Croat military triumph of 1995 known as “Operation Strom,” which, again with American
support, defeated a Croatian Serb secessionist movement backed by Serbia. Vučić incites in Serbs
a lust for revenge, anticipating, and probably hoping for, new wars and territorial re-conquest in
Kosovo, Croatia, and BH, while (at least a half of) Montenegro has been already recaptured.

1. Serbian Church Reclaims Montenegro for Serbia
Although Serbia and Montenegro separated peacefully in 2006, Serbian nationalism never
recognized the Montenegrin people’s plebiscite, nor viewed Montenegro as a sovereign nation and
a nationality distinct from Serbian. The Serbian Orthodox Church preserved the crucial link, and
the Church of Montenegro has been administered by the Patriarch of Serbia since 1920. Since
2006, under a pro-western President Milo Đukanović, Montenegro has advanced political
independence, crowned by NATO membership and EU candidacy. The Vučić regime, supported
by Russia, moved to bring Montenegro back. In 2016, Putin’s Russia, Belgrade, and the pro-Serb
Montenegrin parties even staged a coup attempt against President Đukanović.41 In the first half of
2020, a dispute over church property and new legislation concerning church-state relations led to
a massive unrest in Montenegro and the collapse of its government. The Serbian Orthodox initiated
the protests and carried them out in form of religious processions (litije) through the streets of
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Montenegro’s towns and cities.42 Under pressure from the litije, Belgrade managed to replace the
collapsed government with a new pro-Serb Prime minister picked by the Church and a cabinet
staffed by practicing church members loyal to the Serb church. This kind of a “dual administration”
lasted until end of 2021, when Đukanović forced new elections. A civil war scenario in the divided
nation of 600,000 people has since been frequently mentioned in public discourse.
In September 2021, the Serbian Orthodox Church caused unrest again by appointing as the
new bishop-metropolitan of Montenegro the cleric Joanikije, known for his Great Serb
assimilationist views. To further exacerbate the crisis, the Serb church leaders, including the new
patriarch Porphyry, announced that the new Serb-Montenegrin bishop’s installment would, for the
first time since 1920, take place at Cetinje, the historic church and state capital of the longtime
self-governing Montenegro. When protesters barricaded access roads to Cetinje, the Vučić regime
transported the new bishop Joanikije and patriarch Porphyry from Belgrade to Cetinje by a military
helicopter. Accompanied by heavily armed members of Vučić’s secret service, the unpopular
bishop and the patriarch officiated Joanikije’s installment. Porphyry’s reputation as a man of
interethnic reconciliation through tolerant dialogue has since degraded.

2. Playing with Fire in Bosnia-Herzegovina
Russian leader Vladimir Putin and his Balkan allies, Aleksandar Vučić and Milorad Dodik, the
leaders of Serbia and Bosnian-Serb Republic, have worked for years to destabilize Bosnia and
Herzegovina, which they view as a western project and potential NATO member. American
analyst Ivana Stradner wrote that Russia was playing with fire in the Balkans, threatening another
major regional and possibly European war: “This year marks the 30th anniversary of the beginning
of the Yugoslav wars, Europe’s bloodiest conflict since World War II,” Stradner writes, arguing
that,
although the Balkan states moved toward democratic governance and integration with NATO
and the European Union in the immediate aftermath of the wars, consistent neglect on the part
of the West has contributed to a dramatic backsliding in recent years. Now Russian President
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Vladimir Putin is seizing his opportunity and using the former Yugoslav states as the next
battlefield to weaken NATO and the European Union. . .43
Putin, recognizing on the eve of invasion the independence of the breakaway pro-Russian
provinces in eastern Ukraine, “used the language from the 1990s in Yugoslavia, reminiscent of the
situation at the outbreak of the 1991 war in Croatia and BH in 1992,” reported Al Jazeera
Balkans.44 In recent years, Russia-backed Milorad Dodik, the nationalist leader of the Serb
Republic in BH, has frequently called for the secession and annexation of this entity by Serbia.
The Serb Republic is a serious blunder of western diplomacy, even as it is still celebrated in liberal
Washington as a project that helped end a major war.45 In reality, Washington conceded to Serb
nationalism by legitimizing the product of ethnic cleansing created by Serb leaders Radovan
Karadžiċ and Ratko Mladiċ, who were sentenced by the UN’s International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Former
Croatian president Stjepan Mesić (2000-2010), who opposed the nationalist Franjo Tudjman’s
Bosnia policy aimed at partitioning of the country in collaboration with Serbia, released in 2021
“Appeal for the Rescue of a United BH.” In this document, Mesić points out:
The behavior of the Serb Republic ( Republika Srpska) and its leader, Milorad Dodik,
should be seen as the principal trigger of the crisis . . .Dodik (also) has the support of the
largest Croatian ethnic nationalist party in BiH, the Croatian Democratic Union of BH.. .
.The two share “openly separatist aspirations . . .challenging the Bosnia and Herzegovina's
existence . . .Milorad Dodik also receives support from the Russian Federation. . . .In
addition, the West is responsible for refusing to amend the Dayton Peace Accords that are
a big part of the problem. . . .The Dayton regime must be abolished to make possible radical
change, which requires a long-term engagement of the European Union and the United
Nations. . . 46
In anticipation of Putin’s Ukraine military intervention, the leading Bosnian Serb
nationalist, Milorad Dodik, usually accompanied by Russian ambassador to BH and encouraged
by the Vučić regime in Belgrade, often called for secession. Despite The Hague tribunal verdict
and the EU High Representative’s threat to prosecute and imprison war crimes and genocide
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deniers, Dodik vehemently denies the genocide that Serb forces perpetrated in 1995 against
Muslims prisoners of war at Srebrenica. For Dodik’s “state,” the commanding officer of the mass
murderers at Srebrenica, General Ratko Mladić, sentenced in The Hague for war crimes and
genocide, is viewed as a hero and the nation’s co-founder. Ditto in Serbia. In Belgrade, street
clashes erupted in November 2021 between peace and human rights activists and the nationalists
who painted a mural glorifying General Mladić.47
As observed by German media analysts, the Putin-Vučić-Dodik scenario for Bosnia may
lead to another bloody Balkan war and ethnic cleansing.48 There is no doubt that Bosnian Muslims
would fight for their country to keep it united, as a prominent Bosniak writer stated for Radio Free
Europe. 49 The Serbian Orthodox Church backs the separatist Milorad Dodik and consecrates the
ethnically cleansed war territory as a perennial Serbian land. The new Serb patriarch Porphyry,
while visiting Sarajevo, offered only pleasant words about what once was a multiethnic city, but
said nothing about the Serb siege and bombardment of Sarajevo and its mostly Muslim victims.50
Belgrade scholar Miloš Janković criticizes Porphyry: “when talking about Jasenovac, the patriarch
emphasizes that he is spiritually renewed and empowered there every time. . . However, as soon
as Srebrenica is mentioned, things change radically. . . he condemned the Montenegrin signatories
of the EU Srebrenica Resolution against genocide-denial . . .”51
Western observers of Balkan affairs view todays’ Serbia as an un-European, pro-Russian and
authoritarian country. “Aleksandar Vucic’s authoritarian government is aiding Russian and
Chinese propaganda and allowing genocide denialists to celebrate war criminals,” writes Florian
Bieber, the coordinator for the Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group at the University of Graz,
Austria.52 Similarly, Swedish diplomat Carl Bildt, one of key western mediators during the Balkan
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wars, stated that Serbia's position on Russia's invasion of Ukraine “disqualified Serbia from the
process of joining the European Union.”53 Yet, regarding the pro-Russian course, like Montenegro,
Serbia is divided, and even Vučiċ’s government maneuvers between the EU and Russia. Vučić,
urged in an open letter by a group of influential Serb nationalist intellectuals, had publicly opposed
the western sanctions against Russia after its invasion of Ukraine. Nonetheless, Serbia voted for
the UN General Assembly’s resolution condemning the Russian invasion. Subsequently, Serbia
also voted for the expulsion of Russia from UN’s Human Rights Council. In interfaith relations,
Patriarch Porphyry did not back the Patriarch of Moscow, Kirill, who openly sided with Putin’s
war. Instead, Porphyry cooperated with Onofrio, the metropolitan of Kiev, who calls this war a
fratricidal war and Ukraine his homeland, while appealing for an immediate cease-fire and peace
talks. In his 2022 Easter epistle, Patriarch Porphyry pointed out that every war is a defeat of every
human being, so he prays that peace in Ukraine is unconditionally established as soon as possible,
and that all refugees are returned to their homes.54
Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, and the war that followed, evoke the
“clash of civilizations” debates during the Bosnian war, 1992-1995. The cultural realignments
among foreign powers, and the flow of the foreign volunteers in the Bosnian war of 1992-1995,
inspired Samuel P. Huntington for his “clash of civilizations” theory. As Huntington noticed, both
Ukraine and Bosnia-Herzegovina share the major civilizational-religious divide along what this
American analyst has called “fault lines,” due to the new cultural, rather than ideological,
groupings dividing the new post-cold war rival blocks.55 In his 1993 Foreign Affairs journal article,
Huntington illustrated the map with the boundary that cuts across Ukraine, dividing it between the
western and the eastern pro-Russian sphere, and, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, separated from Serbia
by the fateful Drina river.
According to Serb scholar Vladimir Veljković, radical Serbian nationalists view the war in
Ukraine as Serbia’s opportunity to restart the wars in the Balkans and recover their losses, although
“the Vučić regime continued to maneuver trying to remain Russia’s trusted ally while not
“Vučić istupio oko Rusije pa nasrnuo na Hrvatsku i zemlje iz regije: 'Hibridni rat se vodi jer se ne raduju uspjesima
Srbije,” [Vučić stepped out in regard to Russia and attacked Croatia and countries in the region: “Hybrid war” is
waged as they don’t rejoice to Serbia’s successes.] Telegram.hr, 02/27. 2022, https://www.telegram.hr/politikakriminal/Vučić-istupio-oko-rusije-pa-nasrnuo-na-hrvatsku-i-zemlje-iz-regije-hibridni-rat-se-vodi-jer-se-ne-radujuuspjesima-srbije/
54
“Patrijarh Porfirije u Uskršnjoj molitvi za mir u Ukrajini,” [Patriarch Porphyry in Easter prayer for peace in
Ukraine.] RFE, 04/22. 2022, https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/porfirije-uskrs-srbija-ukrajina/31816089.html
55
Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer, 1993), pp. 22-49.
53

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (MAY 2022) XLII, 4

19

completely alienating the European Union and ruin Serbia’s candidacy for membership. . . at least
until it is clear who wins in Ukraine. And then, in case of a favorable outcome, armed with the will
for expansion, lies, and faith in our own mission. . . maybe we can try something. . .”56 By contrast,
Serbia’s main regional rival, Catholic Croatia, sided strongly with Ukraine. Many Croats perceived
Croatia as the Ukraine of the Balkans and a possible target for joint Serbia-Russian aggression.
“The situation in Ukraine,” stated Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković on national TV,
“reminds a lot of the situation in Croatia in 1991.”57 Croatia has received, mostly through Catholic
charitable organizations, around 15,000 Ukrainian refugees thus far. Catholics in churches and
around them hold vigils for the defenders of Ukrainian cities besieged by the Russian invading
army. One of first manifestations of the Croat support for Ukraine took place on February 28, when
Archbishop of Split officiated mass for peace in Ukraine, with the church choir performing the
Ukrainian hymn “Ukraine still lives” (Šče ne vmerla Ukrajina).58 Similarly, the influential Bosnian
Franciscan theologian, Ivan Šarčević, said in an interview: “every war is a defeat for both faith
and humanity, but now we must stand with the Ukrainian people . . .”59 The official Catholic
Church statement about the war came from the Croatian Bishops Conferences’ Commission
Iustitia et pax. Among other things, the statement points out that, “as the Commission of the
Croatian Bishops' Conference that promotes justice and peace, we therefore call on all religious
communities in the Republic of Croatia, together with the Catholic Church, to condemn the
destruction and killings of war and to open their doors to refugees from Ukraine.”60

EPILOGUE
Forgiveness costs. Whatever the theory of atonement, this is at the heart of
it that forgiveness costs. . . It is difficult to face up to our complicity because
the confession of sins does not come easy. It is also difficult because we do
Vladimir Veljković “Vreme velikih očekivanja,” [The time of great expectations.] 03/12. 2022, Peščanik,
https://pescanik.net/vreme-velikih-ocekivanja/print/
57
Plenković: 'Situacija u Ukrajini podsjeća na Hrvatsku 1991.', [Situation in Ukraine resembles Croatia in 1991.] 24
sata, 02/02. 2022, https://www.24sata.hr/news/plenkovic-situacija-u-ukrajini-podsjeca-na-hrvatsku-1991-818004
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“Još je živa Ukrajina, odjekivalo je na misi u splitskoj katedrali,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 02/28.2022,
https://slobodnadalmacija.hr/split/jos-je-ziva-ukrajina-odjekivalo-je-na-misi-u-splitskoj-katedrali-poslusajteizvedbu-maestra-don-ivana-urlica-nadbiskup-pozvao-vjernike-da-na-cistu-srijedu-poste-i-mole-za-mir-1171608
59
Fra Ivan Šarčević: Svaki je rat poraz ljudskosti i vjere, ali sada treba stati uz ukrajinski narod,” Tacno.net,
03/07.2022, https://www.tacno.net/novosti/fra-ivan-sarcevic-svaki-je-rat-poraz-ljudskosti-i-vjere-ali-sada-treba-statiuz-ukrajinski-narod/
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“Predstavljena Izjava Komisije HBK „Iustitia et pax“ o ratu u Ukrajini”, IKA, 04/21.2022,
https://ika.hkm.hr/novosti/komisija-hbk-iustitia-et-pax-objavila-izjavu-o-ratu-u-ukrajini/
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not want to compound our complicity by claiming sins that are not ours . . .
Reconciliation must do justice to what went wrong. It will not merely
overlook the wrong. We could not bear to live in a world where wrong is
taken lightly, where right and wrong finally make no difference. In such a
world, we—what we do and what we are—would make no difference. Spare
me a gospel of easy love that makes of my life a thing without consequence.
Richard John Neuhaus "Father, Forgive Them", 2000.61
Overcoming controversies from the past is not a process that should lead to
reconciliation with crimes through forgiveness, but a process of learning
how to live with the memory that crimes are part of our history and our
group identity and that nothing can reconcile us with those acts. Facing such
history realistically and objectively is a step towards developing a critical
self-knowledge. By contrast, Churches, by seeking reconciliation and
forgiveness for past crimes pursue a greater power in society. They claim
and assert the monopoly on morality in a society through adjudication and
mediation thereby to strengthen their roles as supreme moral judges.
Todor Kuljić, Cultures of Memory: Theoretical Explications of
Uses of the Past, Belgrade, 2006.62
The Serbs will never again apologize to anyone. . .
Aleksandar Vučić, President of Serbia, 2021.63
In April 2022, the nationalist Aleksandar Vučić was re-elected president of Serbia. In his
victory speech, he delivered a message to the main rival Croatia: “Croats, we want better relations,
but in order to attain it, you don’t have to apologize to the Serbs and do not ask from us to apologize
to you.”64 In doing so, the president of Serbia, who had not only undermined the 2010-2021 SerbCroat reconciliation drive, has also inaugurated the complete reversal of benevolent strategies like
the commemorations for all victims, managing the inconvenient historical truths, mutual interstate
and interfaith apologies, and seeking and offering forgiveness among former enemies. The
erstwhile rapprochement-seeking peoples are again bitter adversaries. The war in Ukraine drove
Serbia and Croatia further apart. Serbia, equated only with Byelorussia, is the most loyal ally to
Russia in Eastern Europe, as opposed to a strongly pro-western Croatia, compared to, say, Poland.
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Since the war’s beginning, three massive pro-Russia rallies were held in Belgrade alone. In
addition, three right-wing pro-Russia parties were for the first time elected to Serbia’s parliament.
According to a poll at the time of Vučić’s re-election, and despite his reassertion of Serbia’s
ambition to join the EU, only 46% of Serbs eligible to vote would approve EU membership in a
referendum, while 65% support Putin’s Russia and a stronger Serb-Russia alliance; 63% support
China and only 8% of Serbs view the USA in a positive light.65
The effects of the new Serbia-Croatia “cold war,” coupled with the destructive policies of
Vučić’s Serbia in BH and Montenegro, could be immediately observed. For example, the
improving status of the Serb minority in Croatia has suddenly deteriorated. In contrast to the
encouraging decrease of anti-Serb rhetoric, graffiti, and incidents after the reconciliation efforts in
the first half of 2021,66 the Serbian National Council in 2022 reported an upsurge of anti-Serb hate
speech in public, and attacks on Serbs, Serb representatives and institutions.67 Concurrently,
interethnic tensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the clashes between Serb-Russian and prowestern Montenegrins, are exacerbated.68 Worsening the new regional crisis even further, Serbia
has escalated the ongoing Serbia-Croatia arms race. Reportedly, the Vučić regime imports new
military technologies from China, Turkey, and France.69
Furthermore, in such a situation, it is hard to count on the churches as engines of
reconciliation as they were during the 2010-2021 reconciliation drive. In a sense, as East and West
are at war in Ukraine, so are Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy. Despite Pope Francis’
tactful statements regarding the role of the Orthodox Church in Putin’s War, Francis’ words have
been strong and clear enough. The pope has repeatedly called for peace in Ukraine, urged solidarity
with the refugees, and condemned the aggressor’s brutality. In his 2022 Easter message, Pope

“U Srbiji najmanja potpora za članstvo u EU u regiji,” [In Serbia the least support for EU in the region.] Novosti,
04/09/2022, https://www.portalnovosti.com/u-srbiji-najmanja-potpora-za-clanstvo-u-eu-u-regiji
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Francis did not mention Russia by name, yet he clearly spoke about Ukraine as a victim and of
Ukrainians as a peaceful people “dragged into a cruel and senseless war.”70
Practically, relations between Eastern and Western Christian churches may soon be the
worst they have been since the Second Vatican Council. Likewise, relations between the
Orthodoxy and Croatian Catholicism have deteriorated to the wartime lows of the 1990s. Croatian
bishops’ 2022 Easter epistles and homilies explicitly condemn the Russian aggression on Ukraine
and urge the faithful to help the refugees. The Croatian Catholic right, which opposed Pope
Francis’ ecumenical course, has been encouraged. Likewise, the anti-western zealots and
ecumenical skeptics in the Serbian Orthodox Church attack Patriarch Porphyry’s conciliatory
rhetoric toward Catholics and Muslims. Theologian Ivica Šola, the mouthpiece of radical Croatian
nationalist Catholicism, perceives the war in Ukraine as a war of religions and clash of
civilizations. He employs the term “Christian Orthodox Jihad” against the West incited by “Tsar
Putin” and Patriarch of Moscow Kirill.71 Šola criticizes Pope Francis’ concession to the Serbian
Orthodox Church regarding the 2017 freeze of the canonization cause for Cardinal Stepinac,
although this papal decision made the breakthrough in the reconciliation process possible. “Now,
it is clear that this papal decision was a catastrophe,” Šola argues, concluding that Orthodox
churches, such as Serbian and Russian, are inherently nationalistic state religions and proven
supporters of aggressive wars. He continues, “Such false Christians do not merit that sainthood of
the anticommunist martyr Cardinal Stepinac is sacrificed and traded for an ecumenical
rapprochement.”72
In short, Serbia and Croatia, the two largest states in Western Balkans, which, until recently
have enabled the regional reconciliation, are now returning to the hostility of the 1991-1995 war.
Croatia views itself as the Ukraine of the Balkans and Serbia as the smaller yet equally dangerous
and aggressive Russia of the Balkans. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Monetengro, as well as

“Pope calls for peace in Ukraine on ‘Easter of war,’ warns of nuclear threat,” The Washington Post, 04/17/2022,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/17/pope-francis-easter-message-ukraine/
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Kosovo, are often mentioned as the flashpoints for the extension of the war in Ukraine. 73 The best
hope for a regional peace is that parallels with Ukraine do not strictly apply. Croatia is not the
same as Ukraine, but an EU and NATO member state. Serbia, again, is not the same as Putin’s
Russia, or quite like Putin’s vassal state of Byelorussia. Montenegro and Albania are also NATO
member states, while the largest NATO base in southeastern Europe is in Kosovo. Hopefully, the
new mandate for President Vučić, and his recent distance from an openly pro-Russian course, will
also strengthen his pro-EU path, and the EU will recognize the opportunity for winning Serbia
over. If there are any hopeful developments, it may be that Serbia is vacillating between loyalties
to Russia and the EU. Since its electoral victory, the Vučić regime is obviously trying to become
less dependent on Russia, balancing itself in between the EU and China.
In conclusion, an overview of the Balkan reconciliation endeavor, 2010-2021, indicates a
mix of encouraging achievements as well relapses of crisis and conflict. Among the participants,
there is also, on both sides, a mix of idealists and enthusiasts and moderates and pragmatic
“realists.” A 2021 scholarly analysis of the Serb-Croat exchanges of apologies during the period
covered in this article summarizes the achievements and obstacles, concluding as follows:
The previous year (2020) led, unexpectedly for many, to the first one’s small
commemorative gestures on both sides after a long time period. Croatian Premier
Plenković's and President Milanović's expressions of regret for the Serb victims in the
military operation “Storm,” and a symbolic act of kneeling in front of the monument to the
victims of Ovčara in Vukovar by Vučić's envoy Matić, send the message that things are
possible in this aspect to start from a standstill. However, so long as the two side’s national
narratives remain embedded in patriotic myths resulting on one-sided views of the conflicts
of the 1990s, it cannot be expected that apologies and other symbolic gestures of
transitional justice resonate and have greater significance . . .74
There remain in Western Balkans enthusiastic believers in a lasting peace and
reconciliation. They hope that reconciliation is possible, and that even purely symbolic gestures
matter. Serbian Patriarch Porphyry still personally administers the Zagreb diocese to emphasize
the importance of Serb-Croat relations. His sent his vicar, Bishop Justin, to administer 2022
Orthodox Easter ceremonies in Zagreb. On this occasion, Bishop Justin expressed the familiar
“War in Ukraine, the Balkans hold their breath”, Osservatorio balcani e caucaso – Transeuropa, 03/01. 2022,
https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/Balkans/War-in-Ukraine-the-Balkans-hold-their-breath-216258; See also
Stradner, “Russia is playing with Fire in the Balkans.”
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Porphyry-styled cordial messages to both residents of the host city and to Orthodox believers. He
added special appeals for peace in Ukraine and paid a visit to Ukrainian refugees accommodated
by the Catholic church near Zagreb. Porphyry also enjoys the support of the Catholic Autograph.hr
and Ekumena.org internet portals and some liberal and leftist intellectual circles in Croatia. The
Serb antiwar activist Veran Matić, remembered notably for his Willy Brandt-style kneeling at the
city of Vukovar in honor of Croat victims, believes that most people in Serbia, Croatia, and BH
feel the need for reconciliation and normalization. “A lot of citizens have a ‘primordial’ (iskonsku)
need for normalization,” Matić points out in a recent interview, adding that Serbia and Croatia bear
responsibility for “creating preconditions for further normalization of mutual relations,
reconciliation, strengthening of trust and friendship. In the 1960s, France and Germany did that,
and today the two are the backbone of Europe's stability. Likewise, Serbia and Croatia can and
must be the reconciled France and Germany of the Balkans. . . “75 Matić, with other Serb liberals,
also believes in the notion that Patriarch Porphyry could play a positive role. 76
Secular and leftist associations for dealing with history and memory remain distrustful of
major religions as agents of reconciliation, especially in post-Yugoslav states, where they have
become religious monopolies allied with ethnic nationalist parties.77 According to this perspective,
the Catholic Church, since the Second Vatican Council, has invested relatively more effort in
ecumenical relations, peace, and human rights as compared with the Serbian Orthodox Church. As
noted earlier, Patriarch Porphyry can be credited only with a relatively less militant nationalistic
rhetoric when compared with earlier patriarchs and the wartime Church supportive of Serbian
nationalism. Yet, the major controversies about the past remain the lasting sources of conflict.
While the Catholic Church has repeatedly apologized for Croat Ustasha crimes against Serbs in
the Second World War, and even suspended canonization proceedings to earn the sister church’s
trust, the Serbian Orthodox Church never condemned Chetnik massacres of Muslims and Catholics
in the same period, never recognized the redeeming role of the Croat antifascist resistance
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members that fought against the Ustasha regime, and has, since the wars of the 1990s, continued
to deny genocide at Srebrenica. Most importantly, secular peace and human rights activists insist
on agreement about the key facts about wars and war crimes through mechanisms such as the
REKOM Reconciliation Network.78
Hopefully there will be soon peace in Ukraine, and another attempt at reconciliation in
Western Balkans. Even as mostly symbolic and commemorative practices, these endeavors proved
that they improve social trust and reduce interethnic tensions. There still remains the question
about the purpose and long-term goals of such reconciliation efforts. In my 2021 book,
Reconciliation and Last Days, published in Belgrade, Serbia, I argue that postwar reconciliation
projects make sense, provided there is a new beginning for wartime enemies, that is, the peoples,
faiths, and states in the region. In other words, the purpose of a longer period of peace and stability
is socio-economic development and a hopeful future. Yet, if social decay continues, and if societies
continue to look to the past and lose human capital, reconciliation becomes pointless--except,
perhaps, as a ceremony accompanying a prolonged collective funeral, leading to extinction of these
small European ethnic nations that missed all chances and opportunities. The conflict beyond war
has lasted far too long. The nationalist myths and new collective identities constructed against “the
other” in the immediate neighborhood cannot be changed, no matter how moving commemorative
practices and nice words are. To make matters worse, a demographic catastrophe has been
unfolding for decades, as young people are leaving en masse to seek jobs and permanent settlement
in the West. Tito’s unified Yugoslavia was far from a perfect society, yet it was a future-oriented
country, with greater economic resources and a positive international reputation. After its collapse,
as Tim Judah observed in his 2019 article “Bye, bye, Balkans,” the new states of the region have
been dramatically running out of their human capital.79 That is to say, the peoples and faiths of
Western Balkans may never see a new beginning, to make the reconciliation rituals future-oriented
incentives rather than a long farewell.
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